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The Duality of Empathy and Human Rights
Panop Phongpetra

While it is clear that various forms of communication from art to literature to photographs fosters
empathy for others and compels humans to identify with and consider others, the exact role such empathy
plays in acknowledging, maintaining, and enforcing human rights is highly controversial. Indeed,
questions concerning the degree to which the creation of empathy allows us to forgo declarations and the
establishment of legal and social norms concerning human rights remain unanswered as scholars and
politicians alike argue about the role of sentiment in creating and maintaining change. Although such
media certainly has a role to play in creating awareness of human rights and generating social support for
policies designed to protect human rights, taken alone it is not a sufficient means of ensuring that human
rights are universally accepted; for, without transcultural norms, it is impossible to dictate how one should
feel about such media, to what extent there is universal agreement about what are human rights, and how
such feelings should be translated into action.
One of the key arguments for the use of sentiment as the primary tool for creating and
maintaining universal human rights is that all humans have a biological predisposition for empathy (Hunt
2008, 39). While this claim is, for all intents and purposes, true, it is, for several reasons, not strong
enough to withstand the assertion that empathy-producing media ought to be the first defense in
protecting human rights. The human brain is inclined to many emotions including anger. Further, it is
equally predisposed to act kindly as it is to act violently. Such predispositions are not only culturally and
socially shaped, thus leading to a variety of actions in different circumstances but are also not explicitly
linked to a particular code of moral behavior. In fact, without established norms and/or legal codes
concerning human rights, media covering human rights abuses may not engender empathy in two entirely
different cultures and even when it does, it may not lead to the same reaction. For example, while in a
Western democracy, a narrative or photograph that demonstrates a human rights abuse such as workers
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being forced to work for countless hours may lead to raising funds or protesting for those harmed, in other
cultures, the lack of moral code equating such work with a violation of human rights would most
ostensibly not lead to empathy or action.
Alternatively, while in different cultures a photo or narrative may evoke feelings of empathy, the
resulting action may look wholly different. For example, take a video of a woman being violently raped.
The video's violence would likely cause feelings of empathy in many people. While in a Western
democracy, people would seek justice for what they would perceive as the man's violation of the woman's
human rights (the US has internal laws against enacting violence upon women including sexual violence),
in many Middle Eastern countries, people would lament the inability of the woman to avoid the situation
by following proper moral codes, such as having a male guardian or staying home with family. The two
culture's different understanding of proper behavior – the US largely favors an individualized autonomous
secular way of life born out of the Enlightenment while the Middle East opts for a religious, collective
way of living – would largely affect how the people responded to and acted upon their empathy.
Proponents of sentimental education also note the historical evidence affirming the use of
empathy as a successful device for engendering and maintaining change. The new popularity of the novel,
specifically the epistolary novel in the 18th century, preceded a growth in awareness and acceptance of
human rights. Indeed, "the three greatest novels of psychological identification of the 18th century,
namely Richardson’s Pamela and Clarissa and Rousseau’s Julie were published in the period preceding
the appearance of the concept of ‘the rights of man’” (Hunt 2008, 39). The process through which these
novels raised awareness of human rights and allowed for the development of what Rorty calls a human
rights culture was largely unconscious and reliant on readers’ identification with characters such as Julie
with whom they would likely never identify in real life due to class or national differences. According to
Hunt, “what moved [the readers] was their intense identification with the characters” (Hunt 2008, 36). As
noted by Alexis de Tocqueville, "human rights could only make sense when valets were viewed as men
too" (Hunt 2008, 38). These novels allowed readers to see that everyone was a person with similar inner
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thoughts, desires, and aspirations, in the process teaching "readers nothing less than a new psychology
and ...lay[ing] the foundations for a new social and political order" (Hunt 2008, 39).
To many of its proponents, the novels’ success in changing moral codes was largely dependent on
the fact that the changes were unconscious, as “the novel... worked its effect through the process of
involvement in the narrative, not through explicit moralizing” (Hunt 2008, 56). They noted that “one feels
oneself drawn to the good with an impetuosity one does recognize … and experience[s] a disgust [one]
do[es] not know how to explain,” a statement which underscores that the visceral nature of people's
responses has a longer-lasting and more potent effect than would a conscious reaction to explicit
moralizing (Hunt 2008, 56). This idea of the power of an unconscious response stands in line with those
supporting a universality to empathy. While examining photographs of war, Virginia Woolf "professes to
believe that the shock of such pictures cannot fail to unite people of good will" (Sontag 2003, 8). Yet as
aptly answered by Susan Sontag, the question still remains: "Does it?" (Sontag 2003, 8). It could easily be
argued that the lack of conscious understanding impedes a rational means of ascertaining a proper
behavioral response. In other words, outside of innate responses like fight or flight, most actions taken in
response to emotion require reason as the primary means of determining the when, what, and how.
Whether, as Woolf notes, seeing such photographs unites people of goodwill at least in spirit, it does not
necessarily unite them in action.
Another issue with the idea of the universality of empathy is that empathy does not, in and of
itself, necessarily answer difficult moral questions. As demonstrated by Skinner, the reporter knew that by
buying a child, she could save a child from a life of slavery and physical and mental torture – clear human
rights violations. Despite her empathy for the child, she ultimately decided against paying for the child
because she felt it was morally wrong to give money to any slave trader (Skinner 2008, 36). Although in
this instance both decisions could be morally justified, the complexity of the decision requires a moral
code and not merely empathy to make a choice.
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A clear distinction for proponents of the use of sentimental education is that while it is not a
means of establishing a moral code, it is a way to develop a human rights culture which is, to them, a
longer-lasting and more potent result. To Rorty “the ability to feel pain …[is] the universal basis of
morality instead of reason” for a human rights culture makes us “self-conscious” and aware of our actions
and allows us to focus on trivializing our small differences, which he finds a more practical way to
confront the problems that lead to human rights violations (Hapla 2017, 40). Indeed, history is rife with
instances in which emotional rather than logical awareness led to change. When abolitionists sought to
overthrow slavery and gain rights for African Americans, they often appealed to the emotional rather than
rational thought. For example, according to philosopher Roman Krznaric, who was discussing the
situation of slaves in sugar plantations in the Caribbean during the 1780s, the empathy-based political
campaign conducted by opponents of slavery was successful in changing the minds of thousands of
individuals. By printing "tens of thousands of copies of a poster showing how many slaves could be
squeezed onto a slave ship, publish[ing] oral testimonies of violence against slaves, and [getting] former
slaves to give public talks about their ordeals," they accessed the empathy of different sections of British
society (Krznaric). In combination with other factors, these campaigns played a major role in ending
slavery in the Caribbean in 1807 and the eventual abolition of slavery elsewhere. Such examples support
the idea that “sentimental education is, therefore [an effective] cultural, historical, and political project
aimed at modeling the sensibility of societies and the age” (Hapla 2017, 43). Generations of Americans
were moved by stories as disparate as Frederick Douglass to not only act against slavery but also, in later
years, seek equality for African Americans in every part of civil and political life.
Yet several flaws exist in this reasoning. The first is that stories have been used by both those
supporting and those opposing human rights with equal effectiveness. Historically, Hitler used stories in
his book Mein Kampf to convince his people of the necessity of exterminating the Jews, a people he saw
as the reason for his compatriots’ woes. In his autobiographical manifesto, Hitler condemned how "the
Jew is not the attacked" but rather the "attacker" who will stop at nothing to bring evil (Hitler 1969).
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While photos of war, whose displays of horrific brutality, can engender feelings of empathy, they can also
incite violence and hatred. Indeed, such photos were originally used by governments to rally their people
around their cause and ensure their devotion to continued violence. As Sontag notes, how the question is
framed by the person viewing the photograph largely affects the emotional response. Woolf and the
pacifist to whom she was writing both framed their viewing of such photos in terms of their already
established disagreement with war and violence. Had the question been, “[h]ow can we best to contribute
to the defense of the Spanish Republic against the forces of militarist and clerical fascism?, the
photographs might instead have reinforced their belief in the justness of that struggle” (Sontag 2003, 10).
More recently, one can look at North Korea and its treatment of Otto Warmbier, a man who, to
almost every American, had his human rights violated by an overzealous and brutal regime. This reaction
as evidenced in the Woolf example is largely dependent on how Americans frame issues of civil rights as
questions of individual rights, including the right against physical violence, trials without representation,
and/or freedom of speech. To those in North Korea, however, who have created internal stories about his
detention and subsequent medical problems, he was, like any other criminal, a man who chose to break
the law and as a result received due punishment. To them, the question should be framed in terms of a
different moral code, one largely dependent on obedience to authority as a means of cementing the
stability of society.
The effectiveness of stories from both sides underscores the largest problem in the use of stories
as the primary means of enforcing human rights. Such stories, while creating empathy, fail to define what
is proper behavior? And how should it be encouraged and enforced? Invoking empathy does not itself
tell us what is the moral decision. A real-world example serves to explicate this idea. In the Middle East, a
region in which Islam is the dominant religion, the correctness of behavior is largely established by the
Koran, a book written entirely by God. To those who believe, God's words are law and the purpose of
much of their lives on Earth is to ensure their entry to heaven after death. As such, while sentimental
storytelling and/or photographs can invoke an emotional response, how one acts upon that response is
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predetermined by a moral code established by God. Such a code, especially as dictated by Sharia, can
encourage behavior like public whippings and stonings, actions which are largely considered human
rights violations in the Western world.
Contrarily, much of Western moral norms are dictated by the ideas established during the
Enlightenment. The Enlightenment emphasized "individual autonomy" or the need to think for oneself as
the foundation of legitimate political self-governance (Hunt 2008, 60). It moved society away from
following religious law and forced individuals to redefine for themselves concepts such as ethics and
morality. Yet it simultaneously left a void where the moral codes supplied by the Church had previously
acted. While individual autonomy allowed a new form of choice in which individuals could determine
what it meant to be human and how we should behave towards each other, it simultaneously threatened
societal cohesion. Still, even those such as Thomas Jefferson, whose writings spoke heavily to the
importance of empathy in forming a community, “recognized that while empathy opened the path to
human rights, it did not ensure that everyone would be able to take that path right away” (Hunt 2008, 68).
Sentimental education undeniably has a place in creating awareness of human rights and
encouraging actions. In many of the world's most unjust tragedies such as slavery in the US and torture in
the Abu Ghraib prison, the use of stories, photographs, and oral testimony led to real societal change and
at least some measurement of justice for the victims. Yet, how the question of human rights is framed
remains critical. As evidenced by many people's reactions to the horrors that occur outside of their own
regions such as famines caused by civil war in Africa or human rights violations due to authoritarian
governments in Asia, empathy can often only extend to those with whom we identify. As Sontag aptly
recognizes, photographs and stories about tragedies outside of our zone of identification only serve to
"nourish belief in the inevitability of tragedy in the benighted or backward-that is, poor-parts of the
world" (Sontag 2003, 56). Without legal codes and declarations, we will remain in a moral abyss, often
certain of our sentiments but largely unsure how to act in furtherance of transcultural universal human
rights.
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